MEMFD_CREATE
Section: Linux Programmer's Manual (2)
Updated: 2017-09-15
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NAME
memfd_create - create an anonymous file
SYNOPSIS
#include <sys/memfd.h>
int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags);
Note:
There is no glibc wrapper for this system call; see NOTES.
DESCRIPTION
memfd_create()
creates an anonymous file and returns a file descriptor that refers to it.
The file behaves like a regular file, and so can be modified,
truncated, memory-mapped, and so on.
However, unlike a regular file,
it lives in RAM and has a volatile backing storage.
Once all references to the file are dropped, it is automatically released.
Anonymous memory is used for all backing pages of the file.
Therefore, files created by
memfd_create()
have the same semantics as other anonymous
memory allocations such as those allocated using
mmap(2)
with the
MAP_ANONYMOUS
flag.
The initial size of the file is set to 0.
Following the call, the file size should be set using
ftruncate(2).
(Alternatively, the file may be populated by calls to
write(2)
or similar.)
The name supplied in
name
is used as a filename and will be displayed
as the target of the corresponding symbolic link in the directory
/proc/self/fd/.
The displayed name is always prefixed with
memfd:
and serves only for debugging purposes.
Names do not affect the behavior of the file descriptor,
and as such multiple files can have the same name without any side effects.
The following values may be bitwise ORed in
flags
to change the behavior of
memfd_create():
- MFD_CLOEXEC
-
Set the close-on-exec
(FD_CLOEXEC)
flag on the new file descriptor.
See the description of the
O_CLOEXEC
flag in
open(2)
for reasons why this may be useful.
- MFD_ALLOW_SEALING
-
Allow sealing operations on this file.
See the discussion of the
F_ADD_SEALS
and
F_GET_SEALS
operations in
fcntl(2),
and also NOTES, below.
The initial set of seals is empty.
If this flag is not set, the initial set of seals will be
F_SEAL_SEAL,
meaning that no other seals can be set on the file.
Unused bits in
flags
must be 0.
As its return value,
memfd_create()
returns a new file descriptor that can be used to refer to the file.
This file descriptor is opened for both reading and writing
(O_RDWR)
and
O_LARGEFILE
is set for the file descriptor.
With respect to
fork(2)
and
execve(2),
the usual semantics apply for the file descriptor created by
memfd_create().
A copy of the file descriptor is inherited by the child produced by
fork(2)
and refers to the same file.
The file descriptor is preserved across
execve(2),
unless the close-on-exec flag has been set.
RETURN VALUE
On success,
memfd_create()
returns a new file descriptor.
On error, -1 is returned and
errno
is set to indicate the error.
ERRORS
- EFAULT
-
The address in
name
points to invalid memory.
- EINVAL
-
An unsupported value was specified in one of the arguments:
flags
included unknown bits, or
name
was too long.
- EMFILE
-
The per-process limit on the number of open file descriptors has been reached.
- ENFILE
-
The system-wide limit on the total number of open files has been reached.
- ENOMEM
-
There was insufficient memory to create a new anonymous file.
VERSIONS
The
memfd_create()
system call first appeared in Linux 3.17.
CONFORMING TO
The
memfd_create()
system call is Linux-specific.
NOTES
Glibc does not provide a wrapper for this system call; call it using
syscall(2).
The
memfd_create()
system call provides a simple alternative to manually mounting a
tmpfs(5)
filesystem and creating and opening a file in that filesystem.
The primary purpose of
memfd_create()
is to create files and associated file descriptors that are
used with the file-sealing APIs provided by
fcntl(2).
The
memfd_create()
system call also has uses without file sealing
(which is why file-sealing is disabled, unless explicitly requested with the
MFD_ALLOW_SEALING
flag).
In particular, it can be used as an alternative to creating files in
tmp
or as an alternative to using the
open(2)
O_TMPFILE
in cases where there is no intention to actually link the
resulting file into the filesystem.
File sealing
In the absence of file sealing,
processes that communicate via shared memory must either trust each other,
or take measures to deal with the possibility that an untrusted peer
may manipulate the shared memory region in problematic ways.
For example, an untrusted peer might modify the contents of the
shared memory at any time, or shrink the shared memory region.
The former possibility leaves the local process vulnerable to
time-of-check-to-time-of-use race conditions
(typically dealt with by copying data from
the shared memory region before checking and using it).
The latter possibility leaves the local process vulnerable to
SIGBUS
signals when an attempt is made to access a now-nonexistent
location in the shared memory region.
(Dealing with this possibility necessitates the use of a handler for the
SIGBUS
signal.)
Dealing with untrusted peers imposes extra complexity on
code that employs shared memory.
Memory sealing enables that extra complexity to be eliminated,
by allowing a process to operate secure in the knowledge that
its peer can't modify the shared memory in an undesired fashion.
An example of the usage of the sealing mechanism is as follows:
- 1.
-
The first process creates a
tmpfs(5)
file using
memfd_create().
The call yields a file descriptor used in subsequent steps.
- 2.
-
The first process
sizes the file created in the previous step using
ftruncate(2),
maps it using
mmap(2),
and populates the shared memory with the desired data.
- 3.
-
The first process uses the
fcntl(2)
F_ADD_SEALS
operation to place one or more seals on the file,
in order to restrict further modifications on the file.
(If placing the seal
F_SEAL_WRITE,
then it will be necessary to first unmap the shared writable mapping
created in the previous step.)
- 4.
-
A second process obtains a file descriptor for the
tmpfs(5)
file and maps it.
Among the possible ways in which this could happen are the following:
-
- *
-
The process that called
memfd_create()
could transfer the resulting file descriptor to the second process
via a UNIX domain socket (see
unix(7)
and
cmsg(3)).
The second process then maps the file using
mmap(2).
- *
-
The second process is created via
fork(2)
and thus automatically inherits the file descriptor and mapping.
(Note that in this case and the next,
there is a natural trust relationship between the two processes,
since they are running under the same user ID.
Therefore, file sealing would not normally be necessary.)
- *
-
The second process opens the file
/proc/<pid>/fd/<fd>,
where
<pid>
is the PID of the first process (the one that called
memfd_create()),
and
<fd>
is the number of the file descriptor returned by the call to
memfd_create()
in that process.
The second process then maps the file using
mmap(2).
- 5.
-
The second process uses the
fcntl(2)
F_GET_SEALS
operation to retrieve the bit mask of seals
that has been applied to the file.
This bit mask can be inspected in order to determine
what kinds of restrictions have been placed on file modifications.
If desired, the second process can apply further seals
to impose additional restrictions (so long as the
F_SEAL_SEAL
seal has not yet been applied).
EXAMPLE
Below are shown two example programs that demonstrate the use of
memfd_create()
and the file sealing API.
The first program,
t_memfd_create.c,
creates a
tmpfs(5)
file using
memfd_create(),
sets a size for the file, maps it into memory,
and optionally places some seals on the file.
The program accepts up to three command-line arguments,
of which the first two are required.
The first argument is the name to associate with the file,
the second argument is the size to be set for the file,
and the optional third argument is a string of characters that specify
seals to be set on file.
The second program,
t_get_seals.c,
can be used to open an existing file that was created via
memfd_create()
and inspect the set of seals that have been applied to that file.
The following shell session demonstrates the use of these programs.
First we create a
tmpfs(5)
file and set some seals on it:
$ ./t_memfd_create my_memfd_file 4096 sw &
[1] 11775
PID: 11775; fd: 3; /proc/11775/fd/3
At this point, the
t_memfd_create
program continues to run in the background.
From another program, we can obtain a file descriptor for the
file created by
memfd_create()
by opening the
/proc/[pid]/fd
file that corresponds to the file descriptor opened by
memfd_create().
Using that pathname, we inspect the content of the
/proc/[pid]/fd
symbolic link, and use our
t_get_seals
program to view the seals that have been placed on the file:
$ readlink /proc/11775/fd/3
/memfd:my_memfd_file (deleted)
$ ./t_get_seals /proc/11775/fd/3
Existing seals: WRITE SHRINK
Program source: t_memfd_create.c
#include <
sys/memfd.h>
#include <
fcntl.h>
#include <
stdlib.h>
#include <
unistd.h>
#include <
string.h>
#include <
stdio.h>
#define errExit(msg) do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \
} while (0)
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd;
unsigned int seals;
char *addr;
char *name, *seals_arg;
ssize_t len;
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s name size [seals]\n", argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr, "\taqsealsaq can contain any of the "
"following characters:\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\t\tg - F_SEAL_GROW\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\t\ts - F_SEAL_SHRINK\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\t\tw - F_SEAL_WRITE\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\t\tS - F_SEAL_SEAL\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
name = argv[1];
len = atoi(argv[2]);
seals_arg = argv[3];
/* Create an anonymous file in tmpfs; allow seals to be
placed on the file */
fd = memfd_create(name, MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
if (fd == -1)
errExit("memfd_create");
/* Size the file as specified on the command line */
if (ftruncate(fd, len) == -1)
errExit("truncate");
printf("PID: %ld; fd: %d; /proc/%ld/fd/%d\n",
(long) getpid(), fd, (long) getpid(), fd);
/* Code to map the file and populate the mapping with data
omitted */
/* If a aqsealsaq command-line argument was supplied, set some
seals on the file */
if (seals_arg != NULL) {
seals = 0;
if (strchr(seals_arg, aqgaq) != NULL)
seals |= F_SEAL_GROW;
if (strchr(seals_arg, aqsaq) != NULL)
seals |= F_SEAL_SHRINK;
if (strchr(seals_arg, aqwaq) != NULL)
seals |= F_SEAL_WRITE;
if (strchr(seals_arg, aqSaq) != NULL)
seals |= F_SEAL_SEAL;
if (fcntl(fd, F_ADD_SEALS, seals) == -1)
errExit("fcntl");
}
/* Keep running, so that the file created by memfd_create()
continues to exist */
pause();
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
Program source: t_get_seals.c
#include <
sys/memfd.h>
#include <
fcntl.h>
#include <
unistd.h>
#include <
stdlib.h>
#include <
string.h>
#include <
stdio.h>
#define errExit(msg) do { perror(msg); exit(EXIT_FAILURE); \
} while (0)
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int fd;
unsigned int seals;
if (argc != 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s /proc/PID/fd/FD\n", argv[0]);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
fd = open(argv[1], O_RDWR);
if (fd == -1)
errExit("open");
seals = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
if (seals == -1)
errExit("fcntl");
printf("Existing seals:");
if (seals & F_SEAL_SEAL)
printf(" SEAL");
if (seals & F_SEAL_GROW)
printf(" GROW");
if (seals & F_SEAL_WRITE)
printf(" WRITE");
if (seals & F_SEAL_SHRINK)
printf(" SHRINK");
printf("\n");
/* Code to map the file and access the contents of the
resulting mapping omitted */
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
SEE ALSO
fcntl(2),
ftruncate(2),
mmap(2),
shmget(2),
shm_open(3)
COLOPHON
This page is part of release 4.13 of the Linux
man-pages
project.
A description of the project,
information about reporting bugs,
and the latest version of this page,
can be found at
https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/.
Index
- NAME
-
- SYNOPSIS
-
- DESCRIPTION
-
- RETURN VALUE
-
- ERRORS
-
- VERSIONS
-
- CONFORMING TO
-
- NOTES
-
- File sealing
-
- EXAMPLE
-
- Program source: t_memfd_create.c
-
- Program source: t_get_seals.c
-
- SEE ALSO
-
- COLOPHON
-