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SSL_alert_type_string
Section: OpenSSL (3) Updated: 2017-05-25 Index
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NAME
SSL_alert_type_string, SSL_alert_type_string_long, SSL_alert_desc_string, SSL_alert_desc_string_long - get textual description of alert information
SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value);
const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value);
const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value);
const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value);
DESCRIPTION
SSL_alert_type_string() returns a one letter string indicating the
type of the alert specified by value.
SSL_alert_type_string_long() returns a string indicating the type of the alert
specified by value.
SSL_alert_desc_string() returns a two letter string as a short form
describing the reason of the alert specified by value.
SSL_alert_desc_string_long() returns a string describing the reason
of the alert specified by value.
NOTES
When one side of an SSL/TLS communication wants to inform the peer about
a special situation, it sends an alert. The alert is sent as a special message
and does not influence the normal data stream (unless its contents results
in the communication being canceled).
A warning alert is sent, when a non-fatal error condition occurs. The
``close notify'' alert is sent as a warning alert. Other examples for
non-fatal errors are certificate errors (``certificate expired'',
``unsupported certificate''), for which a warning alert may be sent.
(The sending party may however decide to send a fatal error.) The
receiving side may cancel the connection on reception of a warning
alert on it discretion.
Several alert messages must be sent as fatal alert messages as specified
by the TLS RFC. A fatal alert always leads to a connection abort.
RETURN VALUES
The following strings can occur for SSL_alert_type_string() or
SSL_alert_type_string_long():
- W/warning
-
- F/fatal
-
- U/unknown
-
This indicates that no support is available for this alert type.
Probably value does not contain a correct alert message.
The following strings can occur for SSL_alert_desc_string() or
SSL_alert_desc_string_long():
- CN/close notify
-
The connection shall be closed. This is a warning alert.
- UM/unexpected message
-
An inappropriate message was received. This alert is always fatal
and should never be observed in communication between proper
implementations.
- BM/bad record mac
-
This alert is returned if a record is received with an incorrect
MAC. This message is always fatal.
- DF/decompression failure
-
The decompression function received improper input (e.g. data
that would expand to excessive length). This message is always
fatal.
- HF/handshake failure
-
Reception of a handshake_failure alert message indicates that the
sender was unable to negotiate an acceptable set of security
parameters given the options available. This is a fatal error.
- NC/no certificate
-
A client, that was asked to send a certificate, does not send a certificate
(SSLv3 only).
- BC/bad certificate
-
A certificate was corrupt, contained signatures that did not
verify correctly, etc
- UC/unsupported certificate
-
A certificate was of an unsupported type.
- CR/certificate revoked
-
A certificate was revoked by its signer.
- CE/certificate expired
-
A certificate has expired or is not currently valid.
- CU/certificate unknown
-
Some other (unspecified) issue arose in processing the
certificate, rendering it unacceptable.
- IP/illegal parameter
-
A field in the handshake was out of range or inconsistent with
other fields. This is always fatal.
- DC/decryption failed
-
A TLSCiphertext decrypted in an invalid way: either it wasn't an
even multiple of the block length or its padding values, when
checked, weren't correct. This message is always fatal.
- RO/record overflow
-
A TLSCiphertext record was received which had a length more than
2^14+2048 bytes, or a record decrypted to a TLSCompressed record
with more than 2^14+1024 bytes. This message is always fatal.
- CA/unknown CA
-
A valid certificate chain or partial chain was received, but the
certificate was not accepted because the CA certificate could not
be located or couldn't be matched with a known, trusted CA. This
message is always fatal.
- AD/access denied
-
A valid certificate was received, but when access control was
applied, the sender decided not to proceed with negotiation.
This message is always fatal.
- DE/decode error
-
A message could not be decoded because some field was out of the
specified range or the length of the message was incorrect. This
message is always fatal.
- CY/decrypt error
-
A handshake cryptographic operation failed, including being
unable to correctly verify a signature, decrypt a key exchange,
or validate a finished message.
- ER/export restriction
-
A negotiation not in compliance with export restrictions was
detected; for example, attempting to transfer a 1024 bit
ephemeral RSA key for the RSA_EXPORT handshake method. This
message is always fatal.
- PV/protocol version
-
The protocol version the client has attempted to negotiate is
recognized, but not supported. (For example, old protocol
versions might be avoided for security reasons). This message is
always fatal.
- IS/insufficient security
-
Returned instead of handshake_failure when a negotiation has
failed specifically because the server requires ciphers more
secure than those supported by the client. This message is always
fatal.
- IE/internal error
-
An internal error unrelated to the peer or the correctness of the
protocol makes it impossible to continue (such as a memory
allocation failure). This message is always fatal.
- US/user canceled
-
This handshake is being canceled for some reason unrelated to a
protocol failure. If the user cancels an operation after the
handshake is complete, just closing the connection by sending a
close_notify is more appropriate. This alert should be followed
by a close_notify. This message is generally a warning.
- NR/no renegotiation
-
Sent by the client in response to a hello request or by the
server in response to a client hello after initial handshaking.
Either of these would normally lead to renegotiation; when that
is not appropriate, the recipient should respond with this alert;
at that point, the original requester can decide whether to
proceed with the connection. One case where this would be
appropriate would be where a server has spawned a process to
satisfy a request; the process might receive security parameters
(key length, authentication, etc.) at startup and it might be
difficult to communicate changes to these parameters after that
point. This message is always a warning.
- UP/unknown PSK identity
-
Sent by the server to indicate that it does not recognize a PSK
identity or an SRP identity.
- UK/unknown
-
This indicates that no description is available for this alert type.
Probably value does not contain a correct alert message.
SEE ALSO
ssl(3), SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(3)
Index
- NAME
-
- SYNOPSIS
-
- DESCRIPTION
-
- NOTES
-
- RETURN VALUES
-
- SEE ALSO
-
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